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growth rate of domestic technology. Given that economic growth in a country depends
on both domestic and foreign technologies, increasing foreign ination also a¤ects the
domestic economy. When each government conducts its monetary policy unilaterally
to maximize the welfare of domestic households, the Nash-equilibrium ination rates
are generally higher than the optimal ination rates chosen by cooperative governments
who maximize the welfare of both domestic and foreign households. Under the CIA
constraint on R&D (consumption), a larger market power of rms amplies (mitigates)
this inationary bias. We use cross-country panel data to estimate the e¤ects of ina-
tion on R&D and also calibrate the two-country model to data in the Euro Area and
the US to quantify the welfare e¤ects of decreasing the ination rates from the Nash
equilibrium to the optimal level.
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1 Introduction
In this study, we explore the long-run e¤ects of ination on economic growth and social
welfare in an open economy. Specically, we develop a two-country version of the Schum-
peterian growth model and introduce money demand into the model via a cash-in-advance
(CIA) constraint on R&D investment in each country.1 Empirical evidence supports the view
that R&D investment is severely a¤ected by liquidity requirements. For example, Hall (1992),
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Opler et al. (1999) and Brown and Petersen (2009) nd a
positive and signicant relationship between R&D and cash ows in US rms. According to
Bates et al. (2009), the average cash-to-assets ratio in US rms increased substantially from
1980 to 2006, and this change is partly due to their increased R&D expenditures. Brown et
al. (2009) provide empirical evidence that the increase in corporate cash ow in the 1990s
drives the increase in R&D in that period. Recent studies by Brown and Petersen (2011)
and Brown et al. (2012) explain this phenomenon by providing evidence that rms smooth
R&D expenditures by maintaining a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form of cash reserves.
Furthermore, Brown and Petersen (2014) show that rms use cash reserves to nance R&D
but not capital investment. Berentsen et al. (2012) argue that information frictions and
limited collateral value of intangible R&D capital prevent rms from nancing R&D invest-
ment through debt or equity forcing them to fund R&D projects with cash reserves. We
capture these cash requirements on R&D using a CIA constraint. Given this CIA constraint
on R&D, ination that determines the opportunity cost of cash holdings a¤ects R&D invest-
ment, economic growth and social welfare. In an open economy, monetary policy may also
have spillover e¤ects across countries through international trade.
The results from our growth-theoretic analysis conrm the above intuition and can be
summarized as follows. An increase in the domestic ination rate decreases domestic R&D
investment and the growth rate of domestic technology. Given that economic growth in
a country depends on both domestic and foreign technologies, an increase in the foreign
ination rate also a¤ects the domestic economy. When each government conducts its mon-
etary policy unilaterally to maximize the welfare of only domestic households, the Nash-
equilibrium ination rates are generally di¤erent from the optimal ination rates chosen
by cooperative governments who maximize the aggregate welfare of domestic and foreign
households. Specically, we nd that under the special case of inelastic labor supply, the
Nash-equilibrium ination rates coincide with the optimal ination rates. However, under
the more general case of elastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium ination rates become
higher than the optimal ination rates due to a cross-country spillover e¤ect of monetary
policy. The intuition of this result can be explained as follows. When the government in a
country reduces the ination rate, the welfare gain from increased R&D investment is shared
by the other country through technology spillovers, whereas the welfare cost of increasing
labor supply falls entirely on domestic households. As a result, the governments do not
reduce ination su¢ ciently in the Nash equilibrium.
The wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal ination rates depends on the mar-
ket power of rms. Under the CIA constraint on consumption, a larger markup reduces this
1See also Chu and Cozzi (2014), who introduce a CIA constraint on R&D investment into a closed-economy
version of the Schumpeterian growth model and analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy.
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wedge. This nding is consistent with the interesting insight of Arseneau (2007), who shows
that the market power of rms has a dampening e¤ect on the inationary bias from monetary
policy competition analyzed in an inuential study by Cooley and Quadrini (2003). How-
ever, under the CIA constraint on R&D investment, we have the opposite result that a larger
markup amplies the inationary bias from monetary policy competition. These di¤erent
implications highlight the importance of the di¤erences between the two CIA constraints.
The main di¤erence between the CIA constraint on consumption and the CIA constraint on
R&D is that under the latter, an increase in the ination rate leads to a reallocation of labor
from R&D to production. As a result, higher ination rates would be chosen by governments
in the Nash equilibrium to depress R&D when the negative R&D externality in the form of
a business-stealing e¤ect determined by the markup becomes stronger. In contrast, under
the CIA constraint on consumption, this reallocation e¤ect is absent because an increase
in the ination rate reduces both R&D and production by decreasing labor supply. Given
that increasing the markup worsens a monopolistic distortionary e¤ect on the production of
goods, governments would reduce ination in the Nash equilibrium to stimulate production
when this monopolistic distortion measured by the markup becomes stronger.
We use cross-country panel data to estimate the e¤ects of ination on R&D and nd
that there is a statistically signicant negative relationship between the ination rate and
the R&D share of GDP. Our preferred regression estimate shows that the semi-elasticity of
R&D with respect to ination is -0.374 (i.e., a 1% increase in the ination rate is associated
with a decrease in the R&D share of GDP by 0.374 percent). We also calibrate the two-
country model to aggregate data in the Euro Area and the US to simulate the quantitative
e¤ects of ination on R&D. We nd that the simulated semi-elasticities of R&D with respect
to ination are -0.448 for the Euro Area and -0.266 for the US. These values are in line with
the regression estimate.
In the numerical analysis of the Nash equilibrium, we consider the case in which nal
goods are produced by a CES aggregate of domestic and foreign intermediate goods, which
introduces an international business-stealing e¤ect across countries. In other words, when
a country decreases ination to improve domestic technology, domestic rms are able to
capture a larger share of the global market due to the substitutability of domestic and
foreign intermediate goods. This e¤ect represents a negative externality of monetary policy.
Together with the positive externality from technology spillovers, we nd that the Nash
equilibrium continues to feature an inationary bias. Therefore, we proceed to quantify the
welfare e¤ects of decreasing the ination rates from the Nash equilibrium to the optimal
level. We nd that the Friedman rule is optimal (i.e., a zero nominal interest rate maximizes
welfare). In this case, decreasing the ination rates from the Nash equilibrium to achieve a
zero nominal interest rate in both economies would lead to nonnegligible welfare gains that
are equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 1.038% in the US and 0.249%
in the Euro Area. However, a unilateral deviation to decrease the ination rate from the
Nash equilibrium would hurt the domestic economy and only benet the foreign economy.
For example, we nd that a unilateral decrease in the ination rate in the Euro Area would
reduce its welfare by 0.213% but increase welfare in the US by 1.079%.
This study relates to the literature of ination and economic growth, which explores
the long-run e¤ects of ination on capital investment. Stockman (1981) and Abel (1985)
provide the seminal studies of the CIA constraint on capital investment in the Neoclassical
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growth model. Instead of analyzing the e¤ects of monetary policy in the Neoclassical growth
model, we consider an R&D-based growth model in which economic growth is driven by
R&D investment, which has potentially more important implications on growth and welfare
than capital investment. The seminal study in this literature of ination and innovation-
driven growth is Marquis and Re¤ett (1994), who explore the e¤ects of a CIA constraint on
consumption in a Romer variety-expanding model.2 In contrast, we consider a Schumpeterian
quality-ladder model and analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy via a CIA constraint on
R&D investment as in Chu and Cozzi (2014).3 Huang et al. (2013) also analyze the e¤ects of
monetary policy via CIA constraints on R&D investment but in a Schumpeterian model with
endogenous market structure. The present study di¤ers from the closed-economy analyses
in Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Huang et al. (2013) by considering a two-country setting with
trade in intermediate goods across countries. This open-economy model allows us to explore
the interesting implications of policy competition and coordination across countries, which
are absent in a closed economy. To our knowledge, this is the rst study that analyzes the
e¤ects of monetary policy in a growth-theoretic framework featuring R&D-driven innovation
in an open economy.
This study also relates to the new open economy macroeconomics literature that explores
monetary policy coordination and competition across countries in the presence of nominal
rigidity; see for example Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2002), Benigno and Benigno (2003), Corsetti
and Pesenti (2005) and Bergin and Corsetti (2013). These studies analyze interesting chan-
nels, such as output gap stabilization, terms of trade improvement and production realloca-
tion externality, and their implications on welfare gains from monetary policy coordination.
The present study complements these inuential studies by exploring the internalization of
technology spillovers as an additional source of welfare gains from monetary policy coordi-
nation given that R&D investment is an important component of corporate investment that
central banks pay attention to when conducting monetary policy.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 documents stylized facts. Section
3 presents the model. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of ination. Section 5 concludes.
2 Stylized facts
In this section, we use cross-country panel data to estimate the e¤ects of ination on R&D.
Our data set covers 34 OECD countries for the period 1960-2012 at yearly frequency. We
collect data on R&D from Eurostat/UNESCO and data on ination, population, GDP,
imports and exports from the World Development Indicators. We also use the Ginarte-
Park index of patent rights from Park (2008) and the Fraser index of economic freedom.4
We measure the level of income by real PPP-adjusted GDP per capita and the degree of
2Chu, Lai and Liao (2013) provide an analysis of the CIA constraint on consumption in a hybrid growth
model in which economic growth in the long run is driven by both variety expansion and capital accumulation.
3See Chu and Lai (2013) for an analysis of the money-in-utility approach to model money demand in the
quality-ladder growth model.
4The Ginarte-Park index is available once every 5 years for each country. We interpolate the data series
by assuming that any missing year takes on the same value as the previously available year. We also apply
the same procedure to the Fraser index.
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openness to trade by the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. Table 1 reports the
summary statistics of these variables.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard Min Max
deviation
R&D/GDP (%) 1.8 0.9 0.3 4.8
Ination (%) 10.3 29.1 -30.2 665.4
Income 22591.5 10021.2 2431.7 74012.5
Patent rights 3.5 0.8 1.4 4.9
Economic freedom 6.9 1.2 3.4 8.8
Population (millions) 30.3 47.3 0.3 313.9
Trade/GDP (%) 34.5 21.8 0.0 166.7
Observations 648
Our theoretical model predicts a negative relationship between ination and R&D. Our
regression results are consistent with this theoretical implication. Table 2 reports the results
from our panel regressions and shows a negative relationship between ination and R&D.
Table 2: Panel regression results
Dependent variable: 100*log(R&D/GDP)
Method: Pooled regression Country FE Country and year FE
Regressors
Ination
-1.0827***
(0.000)
-0.5637***
(0.000)
-0.3737***
(0.000)
Income
0.0032***
(0.000)
0.0013***
(0.001)
0.0014***
(0.003)
Patent rights
11.7772***
(0.005)
17.1994***
(0.000)
12.4010***
(0.000)
Economic freedom
5.9472
(0.101)
6.5400***
(0.001)
6.9683***
(0.003)
Population
-0.1110***
(0.003)
-0.3795***
(0.004)
-0.4614***
(0.000)
Openness
0.8109***
(0.000)
0.0404
(0.738)
-0.1199
(0.351)
Observations
Adj-R2
648
0.4325
648
0.9254
648
0.9375
Notes: p-values in parentheses. FE denotes xed e¤ects.
The regression coe¢ cients on ination are all signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 1
percent level. In our preferred regression specication with both country and year xed
e¤ects, the estimated semi-elasticity of R&D with respect to ination is -0.374. In other
words, a 1% increase in the ination rate is associated with a decrease in the R&D share
of GDP by 0.374 percent. To identify whether it is the long-run or short-run component of
ination that is driving our results, we have also used the Hodrick-Prescott lter to extract
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the trend and the cyclical component of ination. After repeating the regressions in Table
2, we nd that the negative relationship between R&D and ination is all due to trend
ination; see Table 3 in which we report only the coe¢ cient of trend ination to conserve
space.5 Given that trend ination is more likely to a¤ect ination expectations6 and be
reected in the nominal interest rate that determines the opportunity cost associated with
cash-in-advance constraints, we view these results as encouraging motivating evidence for
our theory.
Table 3: Panel regressions using HP-trend
Dependent variable: 100*log(R&D/GDP)
Method: Pooled regression Country FE Country and year FE
Regressor
Trend ination
p-values
Observations
Adj-R2
-1.2732***
(0.000)
648
0.4362
-0.7065***
(0.00)
648
0.9214
-0.4662***
(0.00)
648
0.9303
Notes: FE denotes xed e¤ects.
3 An open-economy monetary Schumpeterian model
In this section, we develop an open-economy version of the monetary Schumpeterian growth
model. The underlying quality-ladder model is based on the seminal work of Aghion and
Howitt (1992), and we consider a version of the quality-ladder model in Grossman and
Helpman (1991).7 We remove scale e¤ects in the Schumpeterian model by allowing for
increasing complexity in innovation as in Segerstrom (1998).8 Furthermore, we modify the
Schumpeterian model by introducing money demand via CIA constraints on consumption
and R&D investment as in Chu and Cozzi (2014) and extending the closed-economy model
into a two-country setting with trade in intermediate goods. The home country is denoted
with a superscript h, whereas the foreign country is denoted with a superscript f . Both
countries invest in R&D, but we allow for asymmetry across the two countries in a number
of structural parameters. Following a common treatment in this type of two-country models,
we assume labor immobility across countries. Given that the quality-ladder model has been
well-studied, we will describe the familiar components briey but discuss new features in
details. Furthermore, to conserve space, we will only present equations for the home country
h, but readers are advised to keep in mind that for each equation we present, there is an
analogous equation for the foreign country f .
5Regression results for cyclical ination are available upon request; see Appendix B.
6We follow Orr et al. (1995), Ardagna et al. (2007) and Ardagna (2009) to use trend ination from the
Hodrick-Prescott lter as a proxy for ination expectations.
7See also Segerstrom et al. (1990) for another seminal study of the quality-ladder model.
8See for example Jones (1999) for a discussion of scale e¤ects in R&D-based growth models.
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3.1 Household
In each country, there is a representative household. In country h, the population size is
Nht , and its law of motion is _N
h
t = nN
h
t , where n > 0 is the exogenous population growth
rate. Total population in the world is Nt = Nht + N
f
t , where N
f
t is the population size in
country f , which is assumed to have the same population growth rate n. The lifetime utility
function of the household in country h is given by9
Uh =
Z 1
0
e t

ln cht + 
h ln(1  lht )

dt, (1)
where cht denotes per capita consumption of nal goods and l
h
t denotes the supply of labor
per person in country h at time t. The parameters  > 0 and h  0 determine respectively
subjective discounting and leisure preference. We allow for asymmetry in h across the two
countries.
The asset-accumulation equation expressed in real terms (i.e., denominated in units of
nal goods) is given by
_aht + _m
h
t = (r
h
t   n)aht   (ht + n)mht + iht bht + wht lht + ht   cht . (2)
aht is the real value of nancial assets (in the form of equity shares in monopolistic rms)
owned by each member of the household in country h. rht is the real interest rate in country h.
According to the Fisher identity, it is equal to rht = i
h
t   ht , where iht is the nominal interest
rate and ht is the ination rate in country h. m
h
t is the real value of domestic currency
held by each member of the household partly to facilitate the payment of consumption
goods that are purchased domestically10 and partly to facilitate money lending to R&D
entrepreneurs subject to the following constraint: bht + 
hcht  mht , where bht is the real value
of domestic currency borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs to nance their R&D investment and
h  0 parameterizes the strength of the CIA constraint on consumption. As the household
accumulates more moneymht , its money lending b
h
t to R&D entrepreneurs also increases, and
the rate of return on bht is the nominal interest rate i
h
t .
11 wht is the real wage rate in country
h. Finally, ht is the real value of a lump-sum transfer (or tax if 
h
t < 0) from the government
to each member of the household.
The household maximizes (1) subject to (2) and bht +
hcht  mht , which becomes a binding
constraint in equilibrium. From standard dynamic optimization, the optimality condition
for per capita consumption in country h is
cht =
1
ht (1 + 
hiht )
, (3)
9Here we assume that the utility function is based on per capita utility. Alternatively, one can assume
that the utility function is based on aggregate utility in which case the e¤ective discount rate simply becomes
  n.
10In reality, consumers do purchase consumption goods in other countries using foreign currencies; however,
this represents a relatively small share of consumption expenditures of the average household. Therefore,
in this model, we do not consider the use of foreign currency for the purchase of consumption goods in the
other country.
11It can be shown as a no-arbitrage condition that the rate of return on bht must be equal to i
h
t .
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where ht is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2). The optimality condition for labor
supply is
lht = 1 
hcht (1 + 
hiht )
wht
. (4)
Finally, the intertemporal optimality condition is
  _
h
t
ht
= rht     n. (5)
In the case of a constant nominal interest rate ih, (3) and (5) simplify to the familiar Euler
equation: _cht =c
h
t = r
h
t     n.
We consider a global nancial market. In this case, the real interest rates in the two
countries must be equal such that rht = r
f
t = rt.
12 Given that the distribution of nancial
assets across the two countries is indeterminate, we follow Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010)
to assume that monopolistic rms created by innovation of domestic entrepreneurs are owned
by the domestic household.
3.2 Final goods
Final goods for consumption in the two countries are produced by competitive rms that
aggregate two types of intermediate goods using a standard CES aggregator given by
Ct =
h
(Y ht )
( 1)= + (1  )(Y ft )( 1)=
i=( 1)
, (6)
where Y ht and Y
f
t denote intermediate goods produced by country h and country f , respec-
tively. The parameter  2 (0; 1) determines the importance of country hs intermediate goods
in the production of nal goods. The parameter  > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods produced by the two countries. From prot maximization, the
conditional demand functions for Y ht and Y
f
t are respectively
Y ht =


phy;t

Ct, (7)
Y ft =
 
1  
pfy;t
!
Ct, (8)
where phy;t is the price of Y
h
t , and p
f
y;t is the price of Y
f
t . Both of these prices are expressed
in units of nal goods.
Suppose the nominal price of nal goods in country h is phc;t, which is denominated in
units of currency in country h. Then, because nal goods can be freely traded across the two
countries,13 the law of one price holds such that the nominal price of nal goods denominated
in units of currency in country f is pfc;t = "tp
h
c;t, where "t is the nominal exchange rate.
12The nominal interest rates in the two countries would still be di¤erent if the ination rates di¤er across
countries.
13Even if nal goods cannot be traded, the fact that intermediate goods are freely traded is su¢ cient to
ensure pfc;t = "tp
h
c;t.
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3.3 Intermediate goods
Intermediate goods are also produced by competitive rms. Competitive rms in country
h produce Y ht by aggregating a unit continuum of di¤erentiated domestic inputs X
h
t (j) for
j 2 [0; 1]. The standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator is given by14
Y ht = exp
Z 1
0
lnXht (j)dj

. (9)
From prot maximization, the conditional demand functions for Xht (j) is
Xht (j) =
phy;t
phx;t(j)
Y ht , (10)
where phx;t(j) is the price (denominated in units of nal goods) ofX
h
t (j). Finally, the standard
price index of Y ht is p
h
y;t = exp
R 1
0
ln phx;t(j)dj

.15
3.4 Di¤erentiated inputs
In country h, there is a unit continuum of di¤erentiated inputs indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. In
each industry j 2 [0; 1], there is an industry leader who dominates the market temporarily
until the arrival of the next innovation.16 The industry leader employs domestic workers to
produce Xht (j).
17 Specically, the production function is given by
Xht (j) = (z
h)q
h
t (j)Lhx;t(j), (11)
where Lhx;t(j) denotes production labor in industry j of country h. z
h > 1 is the step size of
innovation in country h, and we allow this parameter to di¤er across countries. qht (j) is the
number of quality improvements that have occurred in industry j as of time t.18
Given (zh)q
h
t (j) in industry j, the leaders marginal cost function for the production of
Xht (j) is
mcht (j) =
wht
(zh)q
h
t (j)
. (12)
Standard Bertrand price competition leads to markup pricing. This markup ratio is assumed
to equal the step size zh of innovation in Grossman and Helpman (1991). Here we allow for
14Our results are robust to a more general CES aggregator, under which the monopolistic markup of
di¤erentiated inputs may be determined by the elasticity of substituition. For simplicity, we focus on the
Cobb-Douglas aggregator.
15Derivations available upon request; see Appendix B.
16This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect in the literature; see Cozzi (2007) for a discussion.
17In order to keep the analysis tractable, we do not consider production o¤shoring in this study; see Chu,
Cozzi and Furukawa (2013) for a North-South analysis of monetary policy with production o¤shoring.
18It is useful to note that we here adopt a cost-reducing view of quality improvement as in Peretto (1998).
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variable patent breadth similar to Li (2001) and Iwaisako and Futagami (2013) by assum-
ing that the markup h > 1 is a policy instrument determined by the patent authority.19
For simplicity, we focus on the case in which h = f = , and this assumption can be
partly justied by the harmonization of patent protection across countries as a result of the
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) e¤ective since
1996.20 Furthermore, given that patent policy is not designed by the monetary authority in
reality,21 we treat  as exogenous when deriving optimal monetary policy.
Given the markup ratio , the price of Xht (j) is
phx;t(j) = 
wht
(zh)q
h
t (j)
. (13)
Therefore, the real value of monopolistic prot earned by the industry leader j in country h
is
!ht (j) =
  1

phx;t(j)X
h
t (j) =
  1

phy;tY
h
t , (14)
where the second equality follows from (10). Finally, wage income paid to industry js
workers in country h is
wht L
h
x;t(j) =
1

phx;t(j)X
h
t (j) =
1

phy;tY
h
t . (15)
3.5 R&D
Denote vht (j) as the real value of the monopolistic rm j 2 [0; 1] in country h. Because
!ht (j) = !
h
t for j 2 [0; 1] from (14), vht (j) = vht in a symmetric equilibrium that features an
equal arrival rate of innovation across industries within a country.22 In this case, the familiar
no-arbitrage condition for vht is
rt =
!ht + _v
h
t   ht vht
vht
. (16)
This condition equates the real interest rate rt in the global nancial market to the rate
of return per unit of nancial asset. The asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic prot
19To model patent breadth, we rst make a standard assumption in the literature, see for example Howitt
(1999) and Segerstrom (2000), that once the incumbent leaves the market, she cannot threaten to reenter the
market due to a reentry cost. As a result of the incumbent stopping production, the entrant is able to charge
the unconstrained monopolistic markup, which is innity due to the Cobb-Douglas specication in (9), under
the case of complete patent breadth. However, with incomplete patent breadth, potential imitation limits
the markup. Specically, the presence of monopolistic prots attracts imitation; therefore, stronger patent
protection allows monopolistic producers to charge a higher markup without the threat of imitation. This
formulation of patent breadth captures Gilbert and Shapiros (1990) seminal insight on "breadth as the
ability of the patentee to raise price".
20See Grossman and Lai (2004) for an analysis of the harmonization of patent protection under TRIPS.
21See Chu (2008) for a discussion of the political process in determining patent policy in the US.
22We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium. See Cozzi et
al. (2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique rational-expectation
equilibrium in the Schumpeterian growth model.
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!ht , (b) any potential capital gain _v
h
t , and (c) expected capital loss 
h
t v
h
t due to creative
destruction, where ht is the arrival rate of the next innovation in country h.
There is a unit continuum of R&D entrepreneurs indexed by k 2 [0; 1] in each country,
and they hire R&D labor for innovation. In country h, entrepreneur ks wage payment to
R&D labor is wht L
h
r;t(k). However, to facilitate this wage payment, the entrepreneur needs
to borrow domestic currency23 from the domestic household.24 The real value of money
borrowed is bht (k) = 
hwht L
h
r;t(k), where 
h 2 (0; 1] is the fraction of wage payment that
requires the use of currency. We follow the formulation in Chu and Cozzi (2014) to impose
a CIA constraint on R&D such that the cost of borrowing is iht b
h
t (k). Therefore, the total
cost of R&D is (1 + hiht )w
h
t L
h
r;t(k). Free entry implies zero expected prot such that
25
vht 
h
t (k) = (1 + 
hiht )w
h
t L
h
r;t(k), (17)
where the rm-level arrival rate of innovation is ht (k) = '
h
tL
h
r;t(k). To model two sources of
R&D externality commonly discussed in the literature, we assume 'ht = '=[(L
h
r;t)
Zht ], where
Lhr;t is aggregate R&D labor. Z
h
t denotes aggregate technology in country h capturing the
e¤ect of increasing innovation complexity.26 This formulation of increasing R&D di¢ culty
also removes scale e¤ects in the innovation process as in Segerstrom (1998).27 The parameter
 2 [0; 1) measures the degree of R&D duplication externality as in Jones and Williams
(2000).28 The parameter ' > 0 determines R&D productivity. The aggregate arrival rate of
innovation in country h is
ht =
Z 1
0
ht (k)dk =
'(Lhr;t)
1 
Zht
. (18)
3.6 Monetary authority
The nominal value of the aggregate money supply in country h is Mht . Then, the real value
of the aggregate money balance in country h is mhtN
h
t = M
h
t =p
h
c;t, where p
h
c;t is the price
23Given that this is wage payment to workers in the domestic economy, the wage payment is naturally paid
in domestic currency. Furthermore, there is no incentive for the entrepreneurs to borrow foreign currency and
convert it into domestic currency even when the nominal interest rates di¤er across countries. The reason is
that the two countries pay the same real interest rate, so any di¤erence in the nominal interest rates is due
to the di¤erence in the ination rates. Given that the law of one price holds in our model, the di¤erence in
the ination rates must be equal to the change in the nominal exchange rate.
24Due to the static nature of the R&D sector in this model, we cannot deal with the case in which R&D
entrepreneurs accumulate cash reserves; however, ination would have the same positive e¤ect on the cost
of R&D as in our current treatment in which entrepreneurs borrow cash from the household because the
opportunity cost of using cash to nance R&D is determined by the nominal interest rate in both cases.
25In this study, we do not consider R&D subsidies; see for example Impullitti (2007, 2010) for an open-
economy analysis of R&D subsidies in the Schumpeterian model.
26See Venturini (2012) for empirical evidence based on industry-level data that supports the presence of
increasing R&D di¢ culty.
27Segerstrom (1998) considers an industry-specic index of R&D di¢ culty. Here we consider an aggregate
index of R&D di¢ culty to simplify notation without altering the aggregate results of our analysis.
28We assume  to be the same across countries in order to ensure that Zht and Z
f
t grow at the same rate
in the long run. Equation (27) shows that the balanced growth path would not exist (unless  ! 1) if Zht
and Zft grow at di¤erent rates in the long run.
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of nal goods denominated in units of currency in country h. Therefore, the growth rate
of per capita real money balance is _mht =m
h
t =
_Mht =M
h
t   n   ht , where ht  _phc;t=phc;t is
the ination rate of the price of nal goods in country h. The monetary policy instrument
that we consider is the ination rate ht , which is exogenously chosen by the monetary
authority in country h. Given ht , the nominal interest rate in country h is endogenously
determined according to the Fisher identity iht = 
h
t + rt, where rt is the real interest rate
in the global nancial market. Then, the growth rate of the nominal money supply Mht in
country h is endogenously determined according to _Mht =M
h
t = _m
h
t =m
h
t +n+
h
t . Finally, the
monetary authority in country h returns the seigniorage revenue as a real lump-sum transfer
htN
h
t = _M
h
t =p
h
c;t = [ _m
h
t + (
h
t + n)m
h
t ]N
h
t to the domestic household.
3.7 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations flht ; lft ; cht ; cft ; Ct; Y ht ; Y ft ; Xht (j); Xft (j); Lhx;t(j);
Lfx;t(j); L
h
r;t(k); L
f
r;t(k)g1t=0, a time path of prices fwht ; wft ; phc;t; pfc;t; phy;t; pfy;t; phx;t(j); pfx;t(j); vht ; vft ; "tg1t=0
and a time path of policies fht ; ft ; ht ;  ft g1t=0 such that the following conditions are satised:
 the representative household in country h chooses flht ; cht g to maximize lifetime utility
taking fwht ; phc;t; ht ; ht g as given;
 the representative household in country f chooses flft ; cft g to maximize lifetime utility
taking fwft ; pfc;t; ft ;  ft g as given;
 competitive nal-good rms produce fCtg to maximize prot taking fphc;t; pfc;t; phy;t; pfy;tg
as given;
 competitive intermediate-good rms in country h produce fY ht g to maximize prot
taking fphy;t; phx;t(j)g as given;
 competitive intermediate-good rms in country f produce fY ft g to maximize prot
taking fpfy;t; pfx;t(j)g as given;
 monopolistic rms in country h produce fXht (j)g and choose fphx;t(j)g to maximize
prot taking fwht g as given;
 monopolistic rms in country f produce fXft (j)g and choose fpfx;t(j)g to maximize
prot taking fwft g as given;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs in country h employ fLhr;t(k)g to maximize expected
prot taking fwht ; vht g as given;
 competitive R&D entrepreneurs in country f employ fLfr;t(k)g to maximize expected
prot taking fwft ; vft g as given;
 the market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that chtNht + cftN ft = Ct;
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 the market-clearing conditions for labor in the two countries hold such that lhtNht =
Lhx;t + L
h
r;t and l
f
tN
f
t = L
f
x;t + L
f
r;t; and
 the value of assets equals the value of monopolistic rms in each country such that
ahtN
h
t = v
h
t and a
f
tN
f
t = v
f
t .
3.8 Aggregate economy
Substituting (11) into (9) yields the aggregate production function for Y ht given by
Y ht = Z
h
t L
h
x;t, (19)
where aggregate technology Zht in country h is dened as
Zht  exp
Z 1
0
qht (j)dj ln z
h

= exp
Z t
0
hd ln z
h

. (20)
The second equality of (20) applies the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating the log of (20)
with respect to t yields the growth rate of aggregate technology in country h given by
_Zht
Zht
= ht ln z
h =
(Lhr;t)
1 
Zht
' ln zh. (21)
Similarly, the aggregate production function for Y ft is given by
Y ft = Z
f
t L
f
x;t, (22)
where aggregate technology Zft in country f is dened as
Zft  exp
Z 1
0
qft (j)dj ln z
f

= exp
Z t
0
fd ln z
f

. (23)
Di¤erentiating the log of (23) with respect to t yields the growth rate of aggregate technology
in country f given by
_Zft
Zft
= ft ln z
f =
(Lfr;t)
1 
Zft
' ln zf . (24)
Proposition 1 Given constant nominal interest rates fih; ifg in the two countries, the ag-
gregate economy gradually converges to a unique and stable balanced growth path along which
each variable grows at a constant (possibly zero) rate.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
For the dynamics of the model, Proposition 1 shows that the aggregate economy gradually
converges to a unique and stable balanced growth path (BGP). On the BGP, the share of
labor allocated to each sector is stationary, and technologies fZht ; Zft g grow at a constant rate.
Consequently, (21) and (24) imply that (Lhr;t)
1 =Zht and (L
f
r;t)
1 =Zft must be stationary in
the long run. Given that the share of labor allocated to each sector is also stationary on
the BGP, Lhr;t=N
h
t and L
f
r;t=N
f
t are stationary in the long run. This analysis implies that the
long-run growth rates of home and foreign technologies are
gh 
_Zht
Zht
= h ln zh = (1  )n, (25)
gf 
_Zft
Zft
= f ln zf = (1  )n, (26)
where the steady-state equilibrium arrival rates of innovation are also determined by exoge-
nous parameters given by h = (1  )n= ln zh and f = (1  )n= ln zf . Di¤erentiating the
log of (6) with respect to time yields the growth rate of aggregate consumption given by
_Ct
Ct
=
1
(Y ht )
( 1)= + (1  )(Y ft )( 1)=
"
(Y ht )
( 1)= _Y
h
t
Y ht
+ (1  )(Y ft )( 1)=
_Y ft
Y ft
#
. (27)
On the BGP, the growth rates of nal goods are
_Y ht
Y ht
=
_Zht
Zht
+
_Lhx;t
Lhx;t
= gh + n = (2  )n, (28)
_Y ft
Y ft
=
_Zft
Zft
+
_Lfx;t
Lfx;t
= gf + n = (2  )n. (29)
Therefore, the long-run growth rate of aggregate consumption is gC = (2   )n, and the
long-run growth rate of per capita consumption in the two countries is ghc = g
f
c = (1  )n.
3.9 Steady-state equilibrium labor allocations
Here we sketch out the derivations of the steady-state equilibrium labor allocations in country
h. Integrating (17) over k yields the free-entry condition in the R&D sector given by vht 
h
t =
(1 + hiht )w
h
t L
h
r;t. Equation (16) implies that the balanced-growth value of an innovation is
vht = !
h
t =(r  ghv +h), where ghv denotes the steady-state growth rate of vht . It can be shown
that r   ghv =  on the BGP.29 Substituting these conditions along with (14) and (15) into
the R&D free-entry condition yields
lhr
lhx
=
  1
1 + hih
h
+ h
, (30)
29Derivations available upon request; see Appendix B.
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where lhr;t  Lhr;t=Nht and lhx;t  Lhx;t=Nht denote per capita labor allocations. The second
condition for solving the steady-state equilibrium labor allocations is the resource constraint
on labor given by
lh = lhx + l
h
r . (31)
To determine the steady-state equilibrium per capita labor supply lh, we apply ahtN
h
t = v
h
t
(i.e., the assumption of domestic innovations being owned by the domestic household) on
(2) such that
_vht = r
h
t v
h
t + i
h
t b
h
tN
h
t + w
h
t L
h
r;t + w
h
t L
h
x;t   chtNht , (32)
where we have also used ht = _m
h
t + (
h
t +n)m
h
t and the resource constraint on labor in (31).
Applying r   ghv =  and (17) on (32) yields
chtN
h
t = v
h
t + 
h
t v
h
t + w
h
t L
h
x;t = p
h
y;tY
h
t , (33)
where the second equality follows from vht = !
h
t =( + 
h), (14) and (15). Substituting (33)
and (15) into (4) yields
lh = 1  h(1 + hih)lhx. (34)
Solving (30), (31) and (34) yields the steady-state equilibrium labor allocations.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium labor allocations in country h are given by
lhr =
 1
1+hih
h
+h
1 + h(1 + hih) +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (35)
lhx =
1
1 + h(1 + hih) +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (36)
lh =
1 +  1
1+hih
h
+h
1 + h(1 + hih) +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (37)
where ih = h + r = h + + n+ ghc = 
h + + (2  )n, which is increasing in h.30
Proof. See Appendix A.
Equation (35) shows that R&D labor lhr is decreasing in i
h and h (given that ih =
h + + (2  )n) via the CIA constraint on R&D (captured by h) and the CIA constraint
on consumption (captured by h). The intuition of the e¤ect via h is that a higher nominal
interest rate increases the cost of R&D, which in turn causes R&D entrepreneurs to reduce
their R&D spending. The intuition of the e¤ect via h is that a higher nominal interest
rate increases the cost of consumption relative to leisure; as a result, the household increases
leisure and decreases labor supply, which also reduces R&D labor. Equation (36) shows that
30Empirical evidence supports a positive long-run relationship between ination and the nominal interest
rate; see for example Mishkin (1992) for US data and Booth and Ciner (2001) for European data.
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ih and h have a positive e¤ect on production labor lhx via the CIA constraint on R&D but a
negative e¤ect on lhx via the CIA constraint on consumption. The positive e¤ect of i
h and h
on lhx via 
h is due to the reallocation of labor from the R&D sector to the production sector.
The negative e¤ect of ih and h on lhx via 
h is due to the reduced supply of labor. Equation
(37) shows that labor supply lh is decreasing in ih and h via both CIA constraints.
3.10 Ination and economic growth
We now explore the e¤ects of ination on the growth rate of technologies. To facilitate this
analysis, we dene a transformed variable &ht  Zht =(Nht )1 , and its growth rate is given by
_&ht
&ht

_Zht
Zht
  (1  )
_Nht
Nht
=
_Zht
Zht
  (1  )n. (38)
Using the steady-state equilibrium condition _Zht =Z
h
t = (1  )n, we can rewrite (21) as
&h =
' ln zh
(1  )n(l
h
r )
1 , (39)
where the steady-state equilibrium R&D labor lhr is decreasing in the domestic nominal
interest rate ih and the domestic ination rate h as shown in (35). Therefore, &h is also
decreasing in ih and h. In order for &h to decrease to a lower steady-state value in the
long run, it must be the case that in the short run, _&ht =&
h
t < 0, which in turn implies that
_Zht =Z
h
t < (1   )n. In other words, a permanent increase in the domestic ination rate
leads to a temporary decrease in the growth rate of domestic technology and a permanent
decrease in the level of domestic technology &h. An analogous analysis would show that a
permanent increase in the foreign ination rate leads to a temporary decrease in the growth
rate of foreign technology and a permanent decrease in the level of foreign technology &f .
4 Ination and social welfare
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of domestic and foreign ination on social welfare. On
the BGP, the long-run welfare of the representative household in country h is given by
Uh =
1


ln ch0 +
ghc

+ h ln(1  lh)

. (40)
For analytical tractability, we focus on the special case of  ! 1 in (6) in this qualitative
analysis.31 Substituting (7) into (33) yields cht = Ct=N
h
t . Substituting this condition along
with (6) and ghc = (1  )n into (40) yields
Uh = lnC0 + 
h ln(1  lh) =  lnY h0 + (1  ) lnY f0 + h ln(1  lh), (41)
31We will consider the general case of  > 0 in the subsequent quantitative analysis.
16
where we have dropped all the exogenous terms. The balanced-growth levels of nal goods
are given by
Y h0 = Z
h
0 l
h
xN
h
0 , (42)
Y f0 = Z
f
0 l
f
xN
f
0 , (43)
where the balanced-growth levels of technologies are given by
Zh0 =
(Nh0 )
1 ' ln zh
(1  )n (l
h
r )
1 , (44)
Zf0 =
(N f0 )
1 ' ln zf
(1  )n (l
f
r )
1 . (45)
Substituting (42)-(45) into (41) yields
Uh = [ln lhx + (1  ) ln lhr ] + (1  )[ln lfx + (1  ) ln lfr ] + h ln(1  lh), (46)
where we have once again dropped the exogenous terms. In (46), flhx; lhr ; lhg depend on ih
and h and flfx; lfr g depend on if and f .
In the following subsections, we will derive (a) the ination rate that is unilaterally
chosen by each government to maximize domestic welfare and (b) the ination rates that are
chosen by cooperative governments who maximize the aggregate welfare of the two countries.
Given that the results di¤er under the following three scenarios, we analyze them separately.
In Section 4.1, we consider the case of inelastic labor supply. In Section 4.2, we consider
elastic labor supply with only the CIA constraint on R&D investment. In Section 4.3, we
consider elastic labor supply with only the CIA constraint on consumption. In Section 4.4,
we calibrate the model to provide a quantitative analysis.
4.1 Inelastic labor supply
In this subsection, we consider the case of inelastic labor supply (i.e., h = f = 0). In this
case, (35) and (36) simplify to
lhr =
 1
1+hih
h
+h
1 +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (47)
lhx =
1
1 +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (48)
and lh = 1. Due to inelastic labor supply, the e¤ect of ination operates solely through the
CIA constraint on R&D investment. By analogous inference, the steady-state equilibrium
allocations of R&D and production labors in country f are
lfr =
 1
1+f if
f
+f
1 +  1
1+f if
f
+f
, (49)
17
lfx =
1
1 +  1
1+f if
f
+f
. (50)
Substituting (47)-(50) into (46) and then di¤erentiating Uh with respect to h, we obtain
the following domestic ination rate that is unilaterally chosen by the government in country
h to maximize the domestic households welfare:
hne =
1
h

  1
1  
h
+ h
  1

  r, (51)
where r =  + (2   )n and h = (1   )n= ln zh are determined by exogenous parameters.
By analogous inference, the foreign ination rate that is unilaterally chosen by country fs
government to maximize the welfare of the household in country f is given by
fne =
1
f

  1
1  
f
+ f
  1

  r, (52)
where f = (1  )n= ln zf .
We refer to the pair fhne; fneg as the Nash-equilibrium ination rates because each gov-
ernment pursues its own objective taking the other governments action as given. An inter-
esting observation is that fne is also the foreign ination rate that would be preferred by the
government in country h. To see this result, we di¤erentiate Uh with respect to f and nd
that the optimal foreign ination rate for country h is also fne. Finally, we consider cooper-
ative governments who choose fh; fg to maximize aggregate welfare dened as Uh + U f ,
and we refer to these ination rates as the optimal ination rates denoted as fh ; fg. We
nd that fh ; fg = fhne; fneg. In other words, the unilateral action of each government
gives rise to an internationally optimal outcome; however, in the next subsection, we will
show that this special result is due to the restriction of inelastic labor supply. We summarize
the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under inelastic labor supply, the Nash-equilibrium ination rate unilaterally
chosen by each government coincides with the optimal ination rate chosen by cooperative
governments who maximize aggregate welfare of the two countries.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The comparative statics of the optimal ination rates can be summarized as follows. The
optimal ination rate in country h is decreasing in the domestic innovation step size zh but
increasing in the degree of duplication externality  and the size of the markup . The
intuition of these results can be easily understood if we compare the equilibrium allocation
to the socially optimal allocation. It can be shown that the rst-best optimal ratio of R&D
to production labor is given by32 elhrelhx = (1  ) g
h
gh + 
, (53)
32Derivations available upon request; see Appendix B.
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where gh = (1  )n. Then, we use h = gh= ln zh to rewrite (30) and obtain the equilibrium
ratio of R&D to production labor given by
lhr
lhx
=
  1
1 + hih
gh
gh +  ln zh
. (54)
Comparing (53) and (54), we see that a larger zh causes the equilibrium ratio lhr =l
h
x to
decrease relative to the optimal ratio elhr =elhx worsening the surplus-appropriability problem,33
which is a positive externality. In this case, the optimal policy response is to reduce ination
to stimulate R&D. Second, a larger  causes the equilibrium ratio lhr =l
h
x to increase relative
to the optimal ratio elhr =elhx capturing the negative duplication externality. In this case, the
optimal policy response is to raise ination to depress R&D. Finally, a larger  also causes the
equilibrium ratio lhr =l
h
x to increase relative to the optimal ratio elhr =elhx due to a strengthening of
the (domestic) business-stealing e¤ect,34 which is another source of negative R&D externality.
In this case, the optimal policy response is also to raise ination to depress equilibrium R&D.
4.2 Elastic labor supply with CIA on R&D only
In this subsection, we consider the case of elastic labor supply (i.e., h > 0) with the CIA
constraint on R&D. However, we remove the CIA constraint on consumption by setting
h = f = 0. In this case, (35), (36) and (37) simplify to
lhr =
 1
1+hih
h
+h
1 + h +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (55)
lhx =
1
1 + h +  1
1+hih
h
+h
, (56)
lh =
1 +  1
1+hih
h
+h
1 + h +  1
1+hih
h
+h
. (57)
By analogous inference, the steady-state equilibrium allocations of R&D and production
labors in country f are
lfr =
 1
1+f if
f
+f
1 + f +  1
1+f if
f
+f
, (58)
lfx =
1
1 + f +  1
1+f if
f
+f
. (59)
33The surplus-appropriability problem refers to the case in which R&D entrepreneurs do not take into
account the external benets to consumers when new innovations occur.
34The business-stealing e¤ect refers to the case in which R&D entrepreneurs do not take into account the
external losses su¤ered by current industry leaders when new innovations occur.
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Substituting (55)-(59) into (46) and then di¤erentiating Uh with respect to h, we obtain
the following domestic ination that is unilaterally chosen by the government in country h
to maximize the domestic households welfare:
hne =
1
h

1


 + h
1 + h

  1
1  
h
+ h
  1

  r, (60)
where r =  + (2   )n and h = (1   )n= ln zh. The analogous ination rate unilaterally
chosen by country fs government to maximize the welfare of the household in country f is
given by
fne =
1
f

1
1  

1   + f
1 + f

  1
1  
f
+ f
  1

  r, (61)
where f = (1  )n= ln zf . We next consider cooperative governments who choose fh; fg
to maximize aggregate welfare Uh + U f , and the resulting optimal ination rates are given
by
h =
1
h

1
2

2 + h
1 + h

  1
1  
h
+ h
  1

  r, (62)
f =
1
f

1
2(1  )

2(1  ) + f
1 + f

  1
1  
f
+ f
  1

  r. (63)
We see that hne > 
h
 and 
f
ne > 
f
 . In other words, the unilateral action of each
government generally leads to excessively high ination in the Nash equilibrium due to
a cross-country spillover e¤ect of monetary policy under elastic labor supply. This e¤ect
captures the inationary bias due to monetary policy competition in Cooley and Quadrini
(2003). However, the intuition of our model is di¤erent and can be explained as follows.
When a country lowers its ination rate, the welfare gain from a higher level of technology is
shared by the other country, whereas the welfare cost of increasing labor supply (lh in (57)
is decreasing in h) falls entirely on the domestic household. As a result, the government
does not lower the domestic ination rate su¢ ciently in the Nash equilibrium. In contrast,
cooperative governments would internalize the welfare gain from a higher level of technology
in the other country.
Taking the di¤erence of (60) and (62) yields the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium
and optimal ination rates in country h given by
hne   h =
  1
h + 1
h
2h(1  )
h
+ h
> 0, (64)
which is increasing in the markup . Intuitively, a larger markup strengthens the negative
business-stealing externality as discussed before, and the resulting optimal policy response
is to increase ination to reduce R&D. However, in the Nash equilibrium, the cost of higher
ination that depresses the level of technology is shared by the other country. As a result,
a noncooperative government would increase ination more aggressively than a cooperative
government would, and the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal ination rates
is monotonically increasing in the market power of rms. This result di¤ers from the in-
teresting result in Arseneau (2007), who shows that a larger market power of rms tends
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to reduce the inationary bias. The di¤erent implications between the two studies are due
to the di¤erent CIA constraints. We have analyzed a CIA constraint on R&D, whereas
Arseneau (2007) analyzes a CIA constraint on consumption. In the next subsection, we
show that our model also delivers the insight of Arseneau (2007) under a CIA constraint on
consumption.
Proposition 4 Under elastic labor supply with only a CIA constraint on R&D, the Nash-
equilibrium ination rate unilaterally chosen by each government is higher than the optimal
ination rate chosen by cooperative governments who maximize aggregate welfare of the two
countries. The degree of this inationary bias is monotonically increasing in the market
power of rms.
Proof. See Appendix A.
4.3 Elastic labor supply with CIA on consumption only
In this subsection, we consider the case of elastic labor supply (i.e., h > 0) with the CIA
constraint on consumption. However, we remove the CIA constraint on R&D by setting
h = f = 0. In this case, (35), (36) and (37) simplify to
lhr =
(  1)h=(+ h)
1 + h(1 + hih) + (  1)h=(+ h) , (65)
lhx =
1
1 + h(1 + hih) + (  1)h=(+ h) , (66)
lh =
1 + (  1)h=(+ h)
1 + h(1 + hih) + (  1)h=(+ h) . (67)
By analogous inference, the steady-state equilibrium allocations of R&D and production
labors in country f are
lfr =
(  1)f=(+ f )
1 + f (1 + f if ) + (  1)f=(+ f ) , (68)
lfx =
1
1 + f (1 + f if ) + (  1)f=(+ f ) . (69)
Substituting (65)-(69) into (46) and then di¤erentiating Uh with respect to h, we obtain
the following domestic ination that is unilaterally chosen by the government in country h
to maximize the domestic households welfare:
hne =
1
h

1
(2  )
+ h
+ h
  1

  r, (70)
21
where r =  + (2   )n and h = (1   )n= ln zh. The analogous ination rate unilaterally
chosen by country fs government to maximize the welfare of the household in country f is
given by
fne =
1
f

1
(1  )(2  )
+ f
+ f
  1

  r, (71)
where f = (1  )n= ln zf . We also consider cooperative governments who choose fh; fg
to maximize aggregate welfare Uh + U f , and the resulting optimal ination rates are given
by
h =
1
h

1
2(2  )
+ h
+ h
  1

  r, (72)
f =
1
f

1
2(1  )(2  )
+ f
+ f
  1

  r, (73)
We see that hne > 
h
 and 
f
ne > 
f
 . As in the previous case, the unilateral action of
each government leads to excessively high ination in the Nash equilibrium due to the cross-
country spillover e¤ect of monetary policy. However, the degree of this inationary bias is
now decreasing in the markup . To see this result, we take the di¤erence of (70) and (72)
and derive the following wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal ination rates in
country h:
hne   h =
h + =
h + 
1
2h(2  ) > 0, (74)
which shows that a larger markup  would reduce the inationary bias capturing the damp-
ening e¤ect of monopolistic distortion discussed in Arseneau (2007). It is useful to note
from (65) and (66) that under the CIA constraint on consumption, increasing ination does
not lead to a reallocation of labor from R&D to production but decreases both R&D and
production instead. Equation (66) also shows that when the markup  increases, production
labor decreases. In this case, the optimal policy response is to decrease ination in order
to stimulate production. Given that the ination rate in the Nash equilibrium is higher to
begin with, the government needs to reduce ination more aggressively in order to achieve
the same proportional increase in production lhx, which is a decreasing and convex function
in ih (and hence h).
Proposition 5 Under elastic labor supply with only a CIA constraint on consumption, the
Nash-equilibrium ination rate unilaterally chosen by each government is higher than the
optimal ination rate chosen by cooperative governments who maximize aggregate welfare of
the two countries. The degree of this inationary bias is monotonically decreasing in the
market power of rms.
Proof. See Appendix A.
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4.4 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we provide a numerical analysis of the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination
across countries. We consider the general case with elastic labor supply and both CIA
constraints on R&D and consumption. The two-country model features the following set
of parameters f; n; ; ; zh; zf ; h; f ; ; s; ; h; f ; h; f ; h; fg.35 Given the calibrated
parameter values, we then perform a quantitative analysis on the e¤ects of ination in the
two economies.
To make this quantitative analysis more realistic, we allow for a non-unitary elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods (i.e.,  > 1).36 We consider a value of
2.46 for  that is within the range of empirical estimates in Broda and Weinstein (2006).
For the value of n, we set it to the average long-run growth rate of the number of R&D
scientists and engineers37 in the US38 and the Euro Area39. As for the markup , we set
it to 1.28, which corresponds to an intermediate value of the empirical estimates reported
in Jones and Williams (2000). We follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to set the annual
discount rate  to 0.05 and the time between innovation arrivals f1=h; 1=fg to 3 years,
which allows us to pin down the values of fzh; zfg = fexp(g=h); exp(g=f )g given g. As for
the leisure parameters fh; fg, we calibrate them by setting the per capita supply of labor
flh; lfg to a standard value of 0.33. For the rest of the parameters, we calibrate the model
using aggregate data from 1999 to 200740 in the US and the Euro Area. To x notation, we
consider the US as the home country h and the Euro Area as the foreign country f . We
use data on the relative size of GDP in the US and the Euro Area to calibrate  by setting
(phyY
h +whLhr )=(p
h
yY
h +whLhr + p
f
yY
f +wfLfr ) = 0:58.
41 As for the relative population size,
we dene s  Nht =Nt and calibrate it to data.42 We also normalize N0 to unity. The average
growth rate of total factor productivity in the US and the Euro Area is 0.7%,43 and we use
this value to calibrate the duplication externality parameter  = 1  g=n. We calibrate the
consumption-CIA parameters fh; fg to the ratios of M1 to consumption in the US and
the Euro Area.44 The average ination rates in the US and the Euro Area are respectively
2.7% and 2.1%.45 Given these empirical values of fh; fg, we calibrate fh; fg by setting
fhne; fneg = fh; fg. We report the parameter values in Table 4.
35It is useful to note that ' does not a¤ect the other calibrated parameter values and the simulated welfare
e¤ects.
36We present the equations of the non-cooperative governmentsbest-response functions and their welfare
functions in an unpublished appendix; see Appendix B.
37In the model, the long-run growth rate of technologies is driven by the growth rate of R&D labor as
implied by (21) and (24); i.e., _Zht =Z
h
t = (1  ) _Lhr;t=Lhr;t and _Zft =Zft = (1  ) _Lfr;t=Lfr;t. Therefore, we set the
value of n to the average long-run value of _Lhr;t=L
h
r;t and _L
f
r;t=L
f
r;t, instead of the population growth rate.
38Data source: National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics.
39Data source: Eurostat.
40We do not include data from 2008 onwards due to the international nancial crises.
41Data source: Eurostat.
42Data sources: Eurostat, and OECD Labor Force Statistics.
43Data source: The Conference Board Total Economy Database.
44Data source: Federal Reserve Economic Data and ECB Statistical Data Warehouse.
45Data source: Eurostat.
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Table 4: Calibrated parameter values
 n   zh zf h f  s  h f h f
2:46 0:035 0:05 1:28 1:02 1:02 1:92 1:84 0:58 0:50 0:80 0:16 0:63 0:33 0:56
Under these calibrated parameter values, we can compute the e¤ects of ination on R&D
in the two economies and compare these values to our regression estimate in Section 2. We
nd that when h increases by 1%, R&D/GDP in the US decreases by 0.266 percent (percent
change). When f increases by 1%, R&D/GDP in the Euro Area decreases by 0.448 percent
(percent change). These simulated values for the semi-elasticity of R&D with respect to
ination are in line with the panel regression estimate of -0.374 reported in Section 2.
Figure 1: Non-cooperative governmentsbest-response functions
We can also numerically simulate the best-response functions of the two economies.
Figure 2 shows that the best-response functions are downward-sloping implying that the
monetary policy instruments fh; fg are strategic substitutes. Under the CES aggrega-
tor in (6), one can show that given  > 1, the market share of nal goods (i.e., from (7),
phy;tY
h
t =Ct = 
=(phy;t)
 1) is decreasing in h and increasing in f due to an international
business-stealing e¤ect of technologies fZht ; Zft g on market share.46 Therefore, when the
foreign government reduces f to increase foreign technology, the optimal response of the
home government is also to reduce h in order to improve domestic technology and com-
pete for market share. In this case, the best-response functions should be upward-sloping;
however, there is also a technology-spillover e¤ect across countries. From (33), the level of
consumption in the home country is chtN
h
t = p
h
y;tY
h
t = 
Ct=(p
h
y;t)
 1, where the aggregate
production of Ct is
Ct =
h
(Zht L
h
x;t)
( 1)= + (1  )(Zft Lfx;t)( 1)=
i=( 1)
, (75)
46Derivations available upon request; see Appendix B.
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which uses (6), (19) and (22). We see that an increase in foreign technology Zft increases
aggregate consumption, which in turn increases home consumption (holding phy;t constant)
capturing the technology-spillover e¤ect. In other words, when the foreign government re-
duces f to increase foreign technology, the optimal response of the home government is
to increase h to free-ride on the technology improvement in the foreign country. Equa-
tion (75) shows that an increase in Zft is a closer substitute to an increase in Z
h
t as the
substitution elasticity  increases. The fact that the best-response functions are downward-
sloping in Figure 2 implies that this technology-spillover e¤ect dominates the international
business-stealing e¤ect under the calibrated parameter values.
Finally, our policy experiments are as follows. First, we lower the ination rates in both
economies from the Nash equilibrium to their globally optimal level and examine the e¤ects
on social welfare fUh; U fg. Second, we consider a unilateral deviation from the Nash equi-
librium to the optimal ination rate that maximizes aggregate welfare of the two economies
and examine the asymmetric implications on the two economies. Under the current set of
calibrated parameter values, the optimal nominal interest rates in both economies are zero
(i.e., the Friedman rule is socially optimal) implying that the optimal ination rates are
fh ; fg = f r; rg. We rst consider the case in which the two governments are coop-
erative and agree to decrease the ination rates from the Nash equilibrium to the globally
optimal level of  r. In this case, the welfare gains are nonnegligible and equivalent to a
permanent increase in consumption of 1.038% in the US and 0.249% in the Euro Area as
reported in Table 5.47 However, a unilateral deviation to decrease the ination rate from the
Nash equilibrium would hurt the domestic economy and only benet the foreign economy,
and the cross-country spillover e¤ects are quantitatively signicantly. For example, we nd
that a unilateral decrease in the ination rate in the Euro Area would improve welfare in
the US by 1.079% but reduce its own welfare by 0.213%. Intuitively, a decrease in ination
raises labor supply Lf via the CIA constraints, but the resulting expansion in production in
the Euro Area increases consumption in both economies. It is useful to note that the welfare
cost of decreasing leisure is borne by the Euro Area but by not the US. As a result, the US
experiences a welfare gain whereas the Euro Area experiences a welfare loss. The opposite
is true when the US unilaterally decreases ination. We see in Table 5 that the Euro Area
generally experiences a larger welfare loss (or a smaller welfare gain) than the US. The reason
is that the money-consumption ratio is much higher in the Euro Area (0.63) than in the US
(0.16), which in turn implies that the CIA parameters are larger in the Euro Area than in
the US as reported in Table 4. In this case, when ination decreases, leisure decreases by a
larger amount in the Euro Area than in the US, generating the asymmetric welfare e¤ects
across the two countries.
Table 5: Welfare e¤ects of monetary policy
Uh U f
Cooperative policy (h=f=  r) 1:038% 0:249%
Unilateral policy (f=  r) 1:079%  0:213%
Unilateral policy (h=  r)  0:033% 0:470%
47Welfare gains are expressed as the usual equivalent variation in consumption.
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5 Conclusion
In this study, we have analyzed the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination in an open-economy
version of the Schumpeterian growth model with CIA constraints on consumption and R&D
investment. We nd that economic growth and social welfare are a¤ected by domestic and
foreign ination. Furthermore, the cross-country welfare e¤ects of ination are quantitatively
signicant. These spillover e¤ects give rise to an inationary bias in the Nash equilibrium
and prevent noncooperative governments from implementing optimal policies in the long run.
Given that the optimal nominal interest rates in the two countries are zero in our simulation,
a supranational authority choosing a uniform interest rate to maximize global welfare would
improve welfare. Our analysis serves to provide a quantication of the potential welfare
gains from a common monetary policy in monetary unions.48
Finally, our analysis is based on a semi-endogenous-growth version of the Schumpeterian
model that removes scale e¤ects. It may be a fruitful extension to explore the cross-country
spillover e¤ects of ination in other vintages of the Schumpeterian growth model, such as
the second-generation Schumpeterian growth model in Peretto (1998), Howitt (1999) and
Segerstrom (2000). We leave this interesting extension to future research.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. We assume that the monetary authority adjusts ht to ensure a
stationary ih.49 We dene a transformed variable t  phy;tY ht =vht . Then, di¤erentiating t
with respect to t yields
_t
t
 _p
h
y;t
phy;t
+
_Y ht
Y ht
  _v
h
t
vht
=
_cht
cht
+ n  _v
h
t
vht
; (A1)
where the second equality follows from (33). Combining (14), (16) and (18), the no-arbitrage
condition for vht can be expressed as
_vht
vht
= rht  

  1


ht +
'
 
lhr;t
1 
&ht
; (A2)
where &ht  Zht =
 
Nht
1 
. Substituting the Euler equation _cht =c
h
t = r
h
t     n and (A2) into
(A1) yields
_t
t
=

  1


ht  
'
 
lhr;t
1 
&ht
  : (A3)
To derive a relationship between lhr;t, 
h
t and &
h
t , we rst use p
h
y;t = exp
R 1
0
ln phx;t(j)dj

and
(13) to derive phy;t = w
h
t =Z
h
t . Substituting this condition, (19) and (33) into (4) yields
lht = 1  h
 
1 + hih

lhx;t: (A4)
Then, using (15) and (17) yields
ht =

1 + hih

 
lhr;t
lhx;t
!
ht : (A5)
Combining (A4), (A5) and lht = l
h
r;t + l
h
x;t, we obtain
ht =
(
1 + h
 
1 + hih
  
1 + hih


) 
lhr;t
1  lhr;t
!
ht : (A6)
Combining (18) and (A6) yields the following relationship between lhr;t, 
h
t and &
h
t :
lhr;t = J
h
 
ht ; &
h
t

, (A7)
where
Jhh =  
(
1 + h
 
1 + hih
  
1 + hih

' [1 +  (1  lhr ) =lhr ]
) 
lhr

&h < 0, (A8)
Jh&h =  
(
1 + h
 
1 + hih
  
1 + hih

' [1 +  (1  lhr ) =lhr ]
) 
lhr

h < 0. (A9)
49In the steady state, a stationary h ensures a stationary ih = h + + (2  )n.
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Based on (21), (38), (A3) and (A7), the following dynamic system in terms of ht and &
h
t can
be described by
_t
t
=

  1


ht  
'

lhr;t
 
ht ; &
h
t
1 
&ht
  , (A10)
_&ht
&ht
=
 
' ln zh
 
lhr;t
 
ht ; &
h
t
1 
&ht
  (1  )n. (A11)
Linearizing (A10) and (A11) around the steady-state equilibrium yields
_ht
_&ht

=

a11 a12
a21 a22

| {z }
Jacobian matrix

ht   h
&ht   &h

, (A12)
where
a11 = 
h
"
  1


  ' (1  )
(lhr )
 &h
Jhh
#
> 0; a12 =  
'
 
lhr
1 
h
(&h)2

(1  ) &h
lhr
Jh&h   1

> 0,
a21 =
 
' ln zh

(1  )
(lhr )

Jhh < 0; a22 =
 
' ln zh
  
lhr
1 
&h

(1  ) &h
lhr
Jh&h   1

< 0.
Let 1 and 2 be the two characteristic roots of the dynamic system. The determinant of
Jacobian is given by
Det = 12 = a11a22   a21a12 =

  1

  
' ln zh
  
lhr
1 
h
&h

(1  ) &h
lhr
Jh&h   1

< 0.
(A13)
As indicated in (A13), the two characteristic roots have opposite signs. Together with the
fact that ht is a jump variable and &
h
t is a state variable, these ndings imply that the
dynamic system displays saddle-path stability.
Figure 2: Phase diagram
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The phase diagram is plotted in Figure 2, where the _ht = 0 locus is steeper than the
_&ht = 0 locus. Figure 2 shows that 
h
t and &
h
t gradually converge to a unique steady-state
equilibrium in point A. An analogous proof would show that ft and &
f
t also gradually
converge to their steady-state values. When fht ; &ht ;ft ; &ft g are in the steady state, it can
be shown that the economy is on a unique and stable balanced growth path.
Proof of Proposition 2. Setting _ht = 0 and _&
h
t = 0 in (A10) and (A11) yields the
steady-state equilibrium values of ht and &
h
t given by
h =


  1

(1  )n
ln zh
+ 

, (A14)
&h =
' ln zh
(1  )n
 
lhr
1 
, (A15)
where lhr is still an endogenous variable. From (A15) and (18), the steady-state arrival rate
of innovation in country h is exogenous and given by
h =
(1  )n
ln zh
. (A16)
Substituting (A16) into (A14) yields h = 
 
+ h

= (  1). We make use of this con-
dition and (A5) to obtain (30). Solving (30), (A4) and lh = lhr + l
h
x yields the steady-state
equilibrium labor allocations in (35), (36) and (37). Substituting (35) into (A15) yields the
steady-state value of &h.
Proof of Proposition 3. The analogous expression of (46) for U f is given by
U f = [ln lhx + (1  ) ln lhr ] + (1  )[ln lfx + (1  ) ln lfr ] + f ln(1  lf ). (A17)
The analogous expressions of (35)-(37) in country f are
lfr =
 1
1+f if
f
+f
1 + f (1 + f if ) +  1
1+f if
f
+f
, (A18)
lfx =
1
1 + f (1 + f if ) +  1
1+f if
f
+f
, (A19)
lf =
1 +  1
1+f if
f
+f
1 + f (1 + f if ) +  1
1+f if
f
+f
, (A20)
where if = f + r = f + + n+ gfc = 
f + + (2  )n, which is increasing in f . Under
inelastic labor supply, we set h = f = 0 in (35)-(37) and (A18)-(A20). Then, we substitute
the resulting expressions into Uh +U f from (46) and (A17) and di¤erentiate it with respect
to fh; fg to obtain the optimal ination rates given by
h =
1
h

  1
1  
h
+ h
  1

  r, (A21)
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f =
1
f

  1
1  
f
+ f
  1

  r. (A22)
Therefore, fh ; fg = fhne; fneg in (51) and (52).
Proof of Proposition 4. In the absence of the CIA constraint on consumption, we set
h = f = 0 in (35)-(37) and (A18)-(A20). The government in country h chooses h to
maximize the welfare of the representative household in country h. We substitute (35)-(37)
and (A18)-(A19)under h = 0 into Uh in (46) and then di¤erentiate it with respect to h
to obtain the Nash-equilibrium ination rate hne in country h given by (60). Similarly, the
government in country f chooses f to maximize the welfare of the representative household
in country f . We substitute (35)-(36) and (A18)-(A20) under f = 0 into U f in (A17) and
then di¤erentiate it with respect to f to obtain the Nash-equilibrium ination rate fne in
country f given by (61). The cooperative governments choose fh; fg to maximize the
welfare of both domestic and foreign households. We set h = f = 0 in (35)-(37) and
(A18)-(A20) and substitute the resulting expressions into Uh + U f from (46) and (A17).
Then, we di¤erentiate Uh +U f with respect to fh; fg to obtain the optimal ination rates
given by (62) and (63). Taking the di¤erence between hne and 
h
 as shown in (64) and then
di¤erentiating it with respect to , we nd that
@
 
hne   h

@
=
1 + h 
h + 1
2 h2h (1  ) 
h
h + 
> 0. (A23)
Equation (A23) shows that the wedge between the Nash-equilibrium and optimal ination
rates is monotonically increasing in the market power of rms.
Proof of Proposition 5. In the absence of the CIA constraint on R&D, we set h = f = 0
in (35)-(37) and (A18)-(A20). The government in country h chooses h to maximize the
welfare of the representative household in country h. We substitute (35)-(37) and (A18)-
(A19) under h = 0 into Uh in (46) and then di¤erentiate it with respect to h to obtain the
Nash-equilibrium ination rate hne in country h given by (70). Similarly, the government
in country f chooses f to maximize the welfare of the representative household in country
f . We substitute (35)-(36) and (A18)-(A20) under f = 0 into U f in (A17) and then
di¤erentiate it with respect to f to obtain the Nash-equilibrium ination rate fne in country
f given by (71). The cooperative governments choose fh; fg to maximize the welfare of
both domestic and foreign households. We set h = f = 0 in (35)-(37) and (A18)-(A20) and
substitute the resulting expressions into Uh+U f from (46) and (A17). Then, we di¤erentiate
Uh + U f with respect to fh; fg to obtain the optimal ination rates given by (72) and
(33). Taking the di¤erence between hne and 
h
 as shown in (74) and then di¤erentiating it
with respect to , we nd that
@
 
hne   h

@
=   1
2

h + 
1
2h (2  ) < 0. (A24)
Equation (A24) shows that the wedge the Nash-equilibrium and optimal ination rates is
monotonically decreasing in the market power of rms.
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Appendix B (not for publication)
Table 6: Panel regressions using HP-detrended
Dependent variable: 100*log(R&D/GDP)
Method: Pooled regression Country FE Country and year FE
Regressor
Cyclical ination
p-values
Observations
Adj-R2
-0.1530
(0.797)
648
0.4036
-0.2504
(0.261)
648
0.9171
-0.1949
(0.361)
648
0.9286
Notes: FE denotes xed e¤ects.
B.1 The price index phy;t . Combining (9) and (10) yields
Y ht = exp
Z 1
0
ln
 
phy;tY
h
t

=phx;t (j)

dj

. (B1)
Then, manipulating (B1) yields the standard price index of Y ht given by p
h
y;t = exp
nR 1
0
ln[phx;t (j)]dj
o
.
B.2 Proof of r   ghv =  on the BGP. First, substituting (16) and (17) into (32), we
obtain chtN
h
t = !
h
x;t + w
h
t L
h
x;t. Combining this condition, (14) and (15) yields c
h
tN
h
t = p
h
y;tY
h
t
as shown in (33). Then, substituting (18) into (17) and di¤erentiating it with respect to
time yields
_vht
vht
=
_wht
wht
+ n; (B2)
where we have used (25). Using (15) and (33), (B2) can be rearranged as
ghv 
_vht
vht
=
_cht
cht
+ n: (B3)
Finally, we make use of the familiar Euler equation _cht =c
h
t = r      n and (B3) to derive
ghv = r    on the BGP.
B.3 The rst-best optimal ratio of R&D to production labor. Using standard
dynamic optimization, we maximize a lifetime utility function given by
Uh =
Z 1
0
e t
h
ln cht + ln c
f
t + 
h ln(1  lht ) + f ln(1  lft )
i
dt; (B4)
subject to (7), (8), (19), (21), (22), (24), lht = l
h
x;t + l
h
r;t and l
f
t = l
f
x;t + l
f
r;t. We obtain that
the optimal ratio lhr;t=l
h
x;t is
lhr;t
lhx;t
=
ht
 
' ln zh
  
lhr;tN
h
t
1 
2= (1  ) : (B5)
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The intertemporal optimality condition is
  _
h
t
ht
=
2
htZ
h
t
  : (B6)
Substituting (25) into (B5), we derive
lhr;t
lhx;t
=
(1  )2 n
2
htZ
h
t (B7)
Then, di¤erentiating (B7) with respect to time yields _ht =
h
t =   (1  )n. Combining this
equation and (B6) and substituting it into (B7), we derive the optimal ratio ~lhr =~l
h
x as shown
in (53).
B.4 The non-cooperative governmentsbest-response functions and their welfare
functions. Substituting (7) into (33) yields chtN
h
t = 
 
Y ht
( 1)=
(Ct)
1=. Substituting
this condition along with (6) and ghc = (1  )n into (40) yields
Uh =
   1

lnY h0 +
1
   1 ln


 
Y h0
 1
 + (1  )

Y f0
 1


+ h ln
 
1  lh ; (B8)
where we have dropped all the exogenous terms. Substituting (42)-(45) into (B8) yields
Uh =
   1


(1  ) ln lhr + ln lhx

(B9)
+
1
   1 ln
8<:
" 
' ln zh
  
lhr
1 
lhx
(1  )n
# 1

+ (1  )
" 
' ln zf
  
lfr
1 
lfx
(1  )n

1  s
s
2 # 1 9=;
+h ln
 
1  lh ;
where we have once again dropped the exogenous terms. The government in country h
chooses h to maximize the welfare of the representative household in country h. We sub-
stitute (35)-(37) into Uh in (B9) and then di¤erentiate it with respect to h to obtain the
best-response function in country h given by
(1  )  h +  hh  1 + hih+ h 1 + h  1 + hih	 	h = h
 1

+ =
+(1 )
h
(B10)
where
	h  (  1)
hh   hh  h +   1 + hih2
1 + hih
; (B11)
h  h (  1)
h

h
 
1 + hih

+ h
 
1 + hih

+ h
 
h + 
  
1 + hih
2 
1 + hih
  
1 + hih
 ; (B12)
35

h 
"
Zf0 l
f
x
Zh0 l
h
x

1  s
s
# 1
: (B13)
Moreover, the analogous expression of (B9) for U f is given by
U f =
   1


(1  ) ln lfr + ln lfx

(B14)
+
1
   1 ln
8<:
" 
' ln zh
  
lhr
1 
lhx
(1  )n

s
1  s
2 # 1
+ (1  )
" 
' ln zf
  
lfr
1 
lfx
(1  )n
# 1

9=;
+f ln
 
1  lf :
The analogous expression of (B10) for the foreign governments best-response function is
given by
(1  )  f +  ff  1 + f if+ f 1 + f  1 + f if	 	f = f
 1

+ (1 )=

f+(1 )
(B15)
where
	f  (  1)
ff   ff  f +   1 + f if2
1 + f if
; (B16)
f  f (  1)
f

f
 
1 + f if

+ f
 
1 + f if

+ f
 
f + 
  
1 + f if
2 
1 + f if
  
1 + f if
 ; (B17)

f 

Zh0 l
h
x
Zf0 l
f
x

s
1  s
 1

: (B18)
We use (B10) and (B15) to numerically simulate the best-response functions of the two
economies and use (B9) and (B14) to compute the welfare e¤ect of monetary policy. Figure
1 and Table 5 present the results, respectively.
B.5 International business-stealing e¤ect. Combining (7) and (33) yields chtN
h
t =Ct =

 
Y ht =Ct
( 1)=
: Substituting (6) and (42) into this condition yields
chNh
C
=

 + (1  ) 
h ; (B19)
where 
h is a function of the variables
n
Zh0 ; Z
f
0 ; l
h
x; l
f
x
o
satisfying (B13). Substituting (35),
(36), and (44) into (B19) and di¤erentiating it with respect to h yields
@
 
chNh=C

@h
=   (1  ) (   1) 

h=
[ + (1  ) 
h]2
(
h
 1

+ =
+(1 )
h
)
< 0, (B20)
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where we have used (B10). Substituting (45), (A18) and (A19) into (B19) and di¤erentiating
it with respect to f yields
@
 
chNh=C

@f
=
 (1  ) (   1) 
h=
[ + (1  ) 
h]2
(
f
 1

+ (1 )=

f+(1 )
)
> 0, (B21)
where we have used (B15). Based on (B20) and (B21), the market share of nal goods is
decreasing in h and increasing in f due to the international business-stealing e¤ect via
technologies
n
Zh0 ; Z
f
0
o
.
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